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I. INTRODUCTION 
A Class III medical device, by definition, “support[s] or 
sustain[s] human life” or “presents a potential unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury.”1  As a result, the decision to authorize the sale of 
Class III devices through the premarket approval process requires a 
 
       †   David Schultz is a trial lawyer and partner at Maslon Edelman Borman & 
Brand, LLP, where he focuses his practice on high stakes litigation.  David’s trial 
experience in product liability, personal injury, and wrongful death cases is 
extensive, dating back to his time as an Assistant Minnesota Attorney General 
where he defended the state in such matters.  In private practice, he has 
successfully represented a broad range of companies in complex litigation and 
currently acts as national counsel for a large medical device manufacturer. 
      ††   Scott Aberson is an attorney at Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP.  
He represents business entities, major manufacturers, and individuals in complex 
commercial litigation in the areas of tort and product liability, intellectual 
property litigation, and general business litigation.  Scott has successfully 
represented both plaintiffs and defendants in multiple state and federal 
jurisdictions across the country. 
 1.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
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difficult and time-consuming cost-benefit analysis—i.e., 
“weigh[ing] any probable benefit to health from the use of the 
device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use.”2  
Congress placed exclusive responsibility for conducting this cost-
benefit analysis of medical devices in the hands of the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”).  If the FDA determines the benefits 
of the device outweigh its risks, the device is deemed to be safe and 
effective.  To ensure manufacturers are not subjected to a standard 
of care inconsistent with, or additional to, those imposed by the 
FDA, Congress explicitly preempted any conflicting or additional 
state requirements related to the safety and effectiveness of a 
device.3 
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court 
clarified that, for devices receiving premarket approval, state 
common-law claims or causes of action, such as negligence and 
strict liability, impose “addition[al]” requirements related to the 
“safety or effectiveness of the device” and are therefore expressly 
preempted by § 360k(a).4  In the years since Riegel was decided, 
courts across the country have broadly enforced this statutory 
prohibition and dismissed all manner of claims that seek to impose 
requirements that are “different from, or in addition to”5 the 
standards imposed by the FDA.  In an attempt to survive 
preemption, plaintiffs in some medical device cases have attempted 
to separate out the allegedly defective aspect or component parts of 
a premarket approved medical device, arguing the FDA somehow 
limited its premarket approval to only certain aspects or 
components of a particular medical device or system.  Several 
courts have now addressed the issue, appropriately rejecting this 
argument and concluding that premarket approval applies to the 
entire device or system.  Not to be deterred, plaintiffs in medical 
device cases have filed citizen petitions with the FDA, requesting 
that the FDA “clarify” its approval letters to limit the scope of the 
premarket approval (“PMA”) to only certain components of the 
medical devices.6  The FDA’s denials of these requests to amend its 
approval letters coupled with its assurances it had indeed approved 
 
 2.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 318 (2008) (quoting 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(2)(C)). 
 3.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 4.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–27 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)). 
 5.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1). 
 6.  See, e.g., Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 472 (D. Mass. 
2012); Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
2
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the entire systems demonstrates that, consistent with judicial 
precedent, there is simply no such thing as a limited PMA. 
This article begins by discussing the statutory and regulatory 
background related to the regulation of medical devices.7  Next, it 
addresses the approval processes for Class III medical devices.8  Part 
IV of this article provides a brief history of preemption under the 
Medical Device Act.9  Part V of this article examines recent court 
decisions holding that premarket approval of medical devices 
applies to all aspects and components of the medical device 
system—i.e., that attempting to separate the component parts of a 
medical device system for purposes of preemption is not 
appropriate.10  Finally, this article discusses the FDA’s recent 
denials of plaintiffs’ citizen petitions in medical device cases as 
evidence that the FDA intends premarket approval to apply to an 
entire medical device.11 
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)12 has 
long required the FDA to approve the introduction of new drugs 
into the market.13  But unlike the situation with new drugs, for 
many years the FDA generally lacked authority to regulate the 
introduction of new medical devices; instead, “the introduction of 
new medical devices was left largely for the States to supervise as 
they saw fit.”14  That all changed when Congress enacted the 
 
 7.  See infra Part II. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
 11.  See infra Part VI. 
 12.  Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)). 
 13.  Riegel v. Medronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).  In Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, the United States Supreme Court explained that “Congress’ first significant 
enactment in the field of public health was the Food and Drug Act of 1906,” which 
the Court described as “a broad prohibition against the manufacture or shipment 
in interstate commerce of any adulterated or misbranded food or drug.” 518 U.S. 
470, 475 (1996).  Congress subsequently broadened the scope of the 1906 Act “to 
include misbranded or adulterated medical devices and cosmetics.”  Id. 
 14.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315; see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (“While the FDCA 
provided for premarket approval of new drugs . . . it did not authorize any control 
over the introduction of new medical devices . . . .”).  Many states adopted laws 
and regulations governing medical devices.  See Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, 
The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 
64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 703 n.66 (1997) (identifying thirteen state statutes governing 
3
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Medical Device Amendments of 197615 (“MDA”), “which swept back 
some state obligations” and expanded the FDA’s authority to 
regulate medical devices.16 
The MDA established three regulatory classes of medical 
devices, with varying levels of oversight depending on the risks the 
devices in each class present17 and the “level of control necessary to 
assure the safety and effectiveness of the device[s].”18  Class I 
medical devices pose the lowest risk and are therefore subject to 
the lowest level of government oversight: “general controls,” such 
as labeling requirements and generally applicable design and 
manufacturing standards.19  Class II medical devices are devices that 
cannot be classified as Class I devices because the “general 
controls” applicable to all devices “are insufficient to provide [a] 
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.”20  
Thus, while Class II devices may be marketed without advance 
approval,21 these devices are subject to “special controls,” such as 
performance standards, postmarket surveillance measures, and 
development and dissemination of guidelines.22  Class III devices 
 
medical devices when the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 was enacted).  
 15.  Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 16.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316.  The FDA’s expanded authority as it relates to 
medical devices was due, in part, to advances in medical technologies and 
consumer and regulatory concerns over injuries that resulted from such devices:  
As technologies advanced and medicine relied to an increasing degree 
on a vast array of medical equipment “[f]rom bedpans to brainscans,” 
including kidney dialysis units, artificial heart valves, and heart 
pacemakers, policymakers and the public became concerned about the 
increasingly severe injuries that resulted from the failure of such devices. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475–76 (citations omitted) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., MEDICAL 
DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA’S NEGLECTED CHILD 1 (Comm. Print 1983)). 
 17.  21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316; see also Classify Your 
Medical Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices 
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm (last 
updated Dec. 3, 2012) (“[C]lassification is risk based, that is, the risk the device 
poses to the patient and/or the user is a major factor in the class it is assigned.”). 
 18.  Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 17 (stating that medical devices are 
assigned to one of three classes “based on the level of control necessary to assure 
the safety and effectiveness of the device”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c.  According to 
the FDA’s website, it has established classifications for approximately 1700 
different generic types of devices.  Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 17. 
 19.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316; Classify Your Medical 
Device, supra note 17.  
 20.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 21.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477. 
 22.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316–17. 
4
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have the greatest risk and receive the most federal oversight.23  In 
general, a medical device is assigned to Class III if neither general 
nor special controls would provide a “reasonable assurance of its 
safety and effectiveness,” and the device “is purported or 
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life 
or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing 
impairment of human health” or “presents a potential 
unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”24 
III. CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICE APPROVAL 
Class III medical devices “incur the FDA’s strictest regulation” 
and must receive FDA approval before they may be sold.25  The 
FDA has two different processes by which it approves new Class III 
medical devices.  Most devices are approved based on applications 
urging “substantial equivalence” to pre-existing medical devices,26 
commonly known as the § 510(k) process.27  Alternatively, medical 
devices may be approved through the FDA’s premarket approval 
process,28 a rigorous process that requires a manufacturer to submit 
what is typically a multivolume application.29  Specifically, the 
 
 23.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317; Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 17. 
 24.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 25.  Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001) 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(II)); see also Medical Devices: Premarket 
Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda 
.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice 
/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last modified Jan. 
24, 2012) [hereinafter Premarket Approval] (describing Class III as “the most 
stringent regulatory category for medical devices”). 
 26.  Pre-existing medical devices are those that were already on the market 
when the 1976 Medical Device Amendments were enacted. 
 27.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317.  The § 510(k) process 
“imposes a limited form of review on every manufacturer intending to market a 
new device by requiring it to submit a ‘premarket notification’ to the FDA.”  
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996).  If the FDA concludes the medical 
“device is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a pre-existing device, it can be marketed 
without further regulatory analysis.”  Id.  The § 510(k) process stems from 
Congress’ concerns about both preventing manufacturers of grandfathered 
medical devices—i.e., pre-1976 devices that were allowed to remain on the market 
without FDA approval due to concerns about the impact of withdrawing those 
devices from the market while the FDA completed premarket approval—from 
monopolizing the market while new devices await premarket approval, and 
ensuring that improvements to existing devices can be rapidly introduced into the 
market.  Id. at 477–78. 
 28.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 29.  See id.; see also Premarket Approval, supra note 25 (“PMA is the most 
stringent type of device marketing application required by FDA.  The applicant 
5
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application for premarket approval must contain, among other 
things, “full reports of all information” concerning investigations of 
the device’s safety and effectiveness that have been “published or 
[are] known to or which should reasonably be known to the 
applicant”; a “full statement” of the device’s “components, 
ingredients, and properties and of the principle or principles of 
operation”; “a full description of the methods used in, and the 
facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, 
when relevant, packing and installation of, such device”; samples or 
device components required by the FDA; and “specimens of the 
labeling proposed to be used for such device.”30 
The FDA spends several hundred hours reviewing each PMA 
application,31 “weig[hing] any probable benefit to health from the 
use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from 
such use.”32  If the FDA is not satisfied with the information 
provided, it may request additional relevant data from the 
manufacturer.33  It also may refer the application to a panel of 
outside experts.34  The FDA’s review also includes an evaluation of 
the device’s proposed labeling for purposes of evaluating the 
device’s safety and effectiveness under the conditions of use set 
forth on the label,35 as well as a determination that the device’s 
proposed labeling is neither false nor misleading.36 
After completing its review, the FDA must issue an order either 
granting or denying premarket approval.37  The FDA “grants 
premarket approval only if it finds there is a ‘reasonable assurance’ 
of the device’s ‘safety and effectiveness.’”38  In addition, the FDA 
 
must receive FDA approval of its PMA application prior to marketing the device.”). 
 30.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1). 
 31.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (“The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours 
reviewing each application.”).  By contrast, the § 510(k) review is, on average, 
completed in just 20 hours.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479. 
 32.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C)).  It is because 
of this balancing test that the FDA may “approve devices that present great risks if 
they nonetheless offer great benefits in light of available alternatives.”  Id. 
 33.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(G)). 
 34.  Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2007)). 
 35.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(B)). 
 36.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A)). 
 37.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).  Although FDA regulations provide 
that the FDA’s order must be issued within 180 days after the FDA’s receipt of a 
premarket approval application, the FDA’s review time is typically longer.  Id.; 
Premarket Approval, supra note 25. 
 38.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)).  If the FDA 
determines it cannot approve the medical device’s design, manufacturing 
6
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may “condition approval on adherence to performance 
standards,”39 “restrictions upon sale or distribution, or compliance 
with other requirements.”40  It may also “impose device-specific 
restrictions by regulation.”41 
The FDA’s regulation of medical devices does not end with 
granting the PMA application.  “Once a device has received 
premarket approval, the MDA forbids the manufacturer to make, 
without FDA permission, changes in design specifications, 
manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute, that 
would affect safety or effectiveness.”42  If a manufacturer wishes to 
make changes—e.g., altering an existing device or developing and 
manufacturing a next-generation version of an existing device—the 
manufacturer must submit an application for supplemental 
premarket approval and may implement the changes only after the 
FDA grants that approval.43  An application for supplemental 
premarket approval is evaluated under the same exacting criteria as 
an initial application.44  Moreover, the entire PMA submission, 
including all prior supplements, are “before” the FDA “at the time 
the supplement is reviewed.”45 
 
methods, or labeling in its proposed form, “it may send an ‘approvable letter’ 
indicating that the device could be approved if the applicant submitted specified 
information or agreed to certain conditions or restrictions.”  Id. at 319 (citing 21 
C.F.R. § 814.44(e)).  “Alternatively, the agency may send a ‘not approvable’ letter, 
listing the grounds that justify denial and, where practical, measures that the 
applicant could undertake to make the device approvable.”  Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. 
§ 814.44(f)).  “The FDA thus has quite broad authority to approve, deny, and 
effectuate modifications of an application throughout the PMA process.”  Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2006).  Medical devices are subject to 
various reporting requirements after receiving premarket approval, including: (1) 
“the obligation to inform the FDA of new clinical investigations or scientific 
studies concerning the device which the applicant knows of or reasonably should 
know of”; and (2) the obligation to “report incidents in which the device may have 
caused or contributed to death or serious injury, or malfunctioned in a manner 
that would likely cause or contribute to death or serious injury if it recurred.”  
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.84(b)(2), 803.50(a)).  “The FDA has 
the power to withdraw premarket approval based on newly reported data or 
existing information and must withdraw approval if it determines that a device is 
unsafe or ineffective under the conditions in its labeling.”  Id. at 319–20 (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 360e(e)(1)). 
 39.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 861.1(b)(3)). 
 40.  Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 814.82). 
 41.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1)).  
 42.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i)).  
 43.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c)). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Premarket Approval of Medical Devices, 51 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,354 (July 
7
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IV. PREEMPTION UNDER THE MEDICAL DEVICE ACT 
The MDA includes an express preemption provision in § 360k 
that provides: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no 
State or political subdivision of a State may establish or 
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for 
human use any requirement— 
(1)  which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the 
device, and 
(2)  which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device or to any other matter included in a 
requirement applicable to the device under this 
chapter.46 
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the United States Supreme Court 
held that state common-law tort claims involving medical devices 
that receive FDA approval through the § 510(k) process are not 
preempted by § 360k of the MDA.47  But in doing so, the Court 
declined to conclude that common-law duties are never 
“requirements” within the meaning of § 360k and that the statute 
thus could never preempt common-law actions.48  That is, the Court 
 
22, 1986) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 814) (quoting supplementary 
information not transferred to the Code of Federal Regulations). 
 46.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).  The exception contained in subsection (b) states: 
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the 
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity 
for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under 
such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement 
of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for 
human use if— 
(1)  the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this 
chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption 
were not in effect under this subsection; or  
(2)  the requirement— 
(A)  is required by compelling local conditions, and  
(B)  compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to 
be in violation of any applicable requirement under this 
chapter. 
Id. § 360k(b). 
 47.  518 U.S. 470, 495–96 (1996). 
 48.  Id. at 502–03 (“[W]e do not respond directly to this argument . . . .  
[S]ince none of the [plaintiffs’] claims is pre-empted in this suit, we need not 
resolve hypothetical cases that may arise in the future. . . .  Until such a case arises, 
we see no need to determine whether the statute explicitly pre-empts such a 
claim.”). 
8
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left open the question of whether § 360k preempts state common-
law tort claims regarding medical devices receiving premarket 
approval, as opposed to those devices that were approved through 
the § 510(k) process.49  Following Lohr, the majority of circuits 
addressing this question held that common-law tort claims 
involving medical devices receiving premarket approval are 
preempted.50 
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court 
clarified how this preemption provision is to be applied.51  First, a 
court must determine whether the FDA has established 
requirements applicable to the particular medical device in 
question.52  The Court in Riegel held that the premarket approval 
process does impose certain federal “requirements” upon the 
subject medical devices because “the FDA may grant premarket 
approval only after it determines that a device offers a reasonable 
assurance of safety and effectiveness” and because “the FDA 
requires a device that has received premarket approval to be made 
with almost no deviations from the specifications in its approval 
application.”53  Therefore, for all devices receiving premarket 
approval, this first prong is met.54 
Second, for those devices that undergo the PMA process, a 
 
 49.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 50.  See id.; Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 2004); Brooks 
v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 
254 F.3d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 2001); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 218 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1997).  But see 
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 51.  552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008).  In Riegel, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York alleging 
that a balloon catheter marketed by defendant for use in coronary angioplasty 
procedures—which had received FDA premarket approval—was designed, labeled, 
and manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law, and that 
these defects caused plaintiff to suffer injuries.  Id. at 320.  “The District Court 
held that the MDA pre-empted [plaintiff’s] claims of strict liability; breach of 
implied warranty; and negligence in the design, testing, inspection, distribution, 
labeling, marketing, and sale of the catheter . . . .”  Id. at 312.  Accordingly, the 
district court dismissed these claims.  See id. at 321.  On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and 
negligent design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale 
claims.  Riegel, 451 F.3d at 106.  
 52.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321.   
 53.  Id. at 322–23.   
 54.  See id.  The Court distinguished devices approved through the less 
rigorous § 510(k) process, which have not undergone review for safety or efficacy 
under the MDA, but instead are simply reviewed for equivalence.  Id. at 323. 
9
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court must then determine whether the plaintiff’s state law claims 
impose “requirement[s]” that are “‘different from, or in addition 
to’ federal requirements and that ‘relate[] to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a 
requirement applicable to the device.’”55  The Court concluded 
that the state tort claims for negligence and strict liability at issue in 
Riegel met the second part of this test because the claims imposed 
“requirements” additional to those federally imposed through the 
PMA process.56  The Court noted, however, that “parallel” state 
claims, or those that simply provide a damages remedy for claims 
premised on a violation of federal regulations but do not add to 
federal requirements, are not preempted by § 360k.57 
Since Riegel, “courts across the country have applied 
[§] 360k(a) broadly,” preempting claims ranging from strict 
products liability and negligence to breach of warranty, failure to 
warn and manufacturing and design defect, and negligence per 
se.58  Nonetheless, parties embroiled in medical device litigation 
 
 55.  Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)).   
 56.  Id. at 323–24.   
 57.  Id. at 330.  
 58.  In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 
2d 1147, 1152 (D. Minn. 2009); see also, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 
F.3d 1296, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding claims for “strict liability for 
manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn” and “concerning liability for 
negligent design, manufacture and assembly” preempted); Littlebear v. Advanced 
Bionics, LLC, No. 11-cv-418-GKF-PJC, 2012 WL 6632477, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 19, 
2012) (holding claims for “fraud by nondisclosure” preempted); Tillman v. Smith 
& Nephew, Inc., No. 12 C 4977, 2012 WL 6681698, at *1, *3 (D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2012) 
(granting motion to dismiss because “negligence, strict liability and breach of 
warranty of merchantability” claims were preempted); McClelland v. Medtronic, 
Inc., No. 6:11-CV-1444-Orl-36KRS, 2012 WL 5077401, at *4, *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 
2012) (granting motion to dismiss negligence per se and failure to warn claims 
based on MDA preemption); Haynes v. Cyberonics, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-2700-JEC, 
2011 WL 3903238, at *5–9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2011) (holding strict liability, failure 
to warn, design and manufacturing defect, and breach of warranty claims 
preempted by MDA); Bass v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:09-CV-632-Y, 2010 WL 3431637, 
at *1, *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010) (holding claims for products liability, 
negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and statutory fraud 
preempted by MDA); Poole v. Hologic, Inc., No. 10-314, 2010 WL 3021528, at *1, 
*6 (W.D. La. July 29, 2010) (holding claims for defective design, defective 
manufacture, failure to warn, express warranty, and implied warranty preempted 
by MDA); Anthony v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-cv-2343, 2010 WL 1387790, at *1, *5 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010) (holding claim for manufacturing defect preempted by 
MDA); Rankin v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 09-177-KSF, 2010 WL 672135, at *1, *4 
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 19, 2010) (holding claims for negligent design and manufacture 
preempted by MDA); Funk v. Stryker Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524, 532 (S.D. 
Tex. 2009) (holding claims for design defect, manufacturing defect, failure to 
10
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continue to dispute the extent to which state common-law tort 
claims involving medical devices that received premarket approval 
are preempted, with much of plaintiffs’ efforts focused on avoiding 
preemption by demonstrating the state claims being asserted are 
“parallel.”59 
V. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS HOLD THAT PREMARKET APPROVAL 
OF MEDICAL DEVICES APPLIES TO ALL ASPECTS AND                    
COMPONENTS OF THE DEVICE 
Despite the significant attention still being paid to the issue of 
“parallel” claims,60 some plaintiffs recently have attempted to avoid 
preemption by separating out the allegedly defective aspect or 
component of the medical device at issue and arguing that a 
different preemption analysis should apply to that particular aspect 
or component.  This argument arises most often in cases involving 
a medical device or system where certain components of the device 
 
warn, and statutory fraud preempted by MDA); Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 
1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *1, *8 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (holding claims 
for failure to warn, defective design, defective manufacture, negligence, express 
warranty, and implied warranty preempted by MDA); Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. 
Supp. 2d 769, 780–89 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding claims for failure to warn, 
manufacturing defect, implied warranty, express warranty, misrepresentation, and 
fraud preempted by MDA); Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 282–87 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding claims for negligence, defective design, manufacturing 
defect, failure to warn, express warranty, and implied warranty preempted by 
MDA); Clark v. Medtronic, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093–95 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(holding claims for negligence and failure to warn preempted by MDA) ; Blanco v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566, 578–82 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding 
claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty preempted by 
MDA); Colombini v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., No. 11101/2002, 2009 
WL 2170230, at *1, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 6, 2009) (holding claims for negligent 
design, negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, breach of warranty, and 
strict products liability preempted by MDA). 
 59.  See James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, (New) Medical Device                    
Preemption Scorecard, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Aug. 21, 2008, 7:00 AM),                   
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-medical-device-preemption 
-scorecard.html (cataloguing and describing post-Riegel medical device 
preemption decisions).  See generally J. David Prince, The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, 
Preemption, and Pleading the Particulars, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034 (2013) 
(discussing the nature of parallel claims and identifying unresolved issues related 
to preemption). 
 60.  See, e.g., Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (holding negligence claim based on alleged failure to report to the FDA 
known risks associated with medical device was not preempted by § 360k of the 
MDA because the state-law duty of care “parallels” a federal-law duty imposed by 
the MDA). 
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or system (or predecessor device components) were initially 
approved through the separate § 510(k) process. 
For example, in Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., plaintiff received an 
artificial hip replacement system manufactured by defendant on or 
about November 15, 2006.61  The hip replacement system, called a 
Howmedica Osteonics Trident System (“Trident System”), 
consisted of several components, including an Osteonics Trident 
PSL Acetabular Shell (“acetabular shell” or “acetabular cup”).62  
After his surgery, plaintiff began experiencing pain in his thigh, 
groin, and hip, which persisted for some time.63  Plaintiff was 
subsequently advised by his doctor that his pain was caused by a 
failure in his hip prosthesis.64  Plaintiff asserted his pain was due to 
loosening of the acetabular shell component of his hip prosthesis, 
caused by residues that remained on the shell after manufacturing 
and packaging.65  “It [was] undisputed that the acetabular shell 
received § 510(k) approval and was commercially available well 
before [p]laintiff received his hip replacement.”66  The acetabular 
shell was later incorporated into the Trident System, which 
received premarket approval on or about February 3, 2003, 
approximately three-and-a-half years before plaintiff received the 
device.67 
Plaintiff sued defendant alleging manufacturing, design, and 
marketing defects in the acetabular shell.68  Defendant 
subsequently moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, arguing they were 
preempted under § 360k(a).69  In response, plaintiff contended his 
claims were not preempted because the acetabular shell was not 
part of the Trident System that was approved via the PMA process, 
but instead was FDA-approved only through the § 510(k) process.70 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas disagreed, concluding instead that the Trident System 
 
 61.  724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 652. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id.  Specifically, plaintiff asserted claims for relief under strict liability, 
negligence, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  Id.  Plaintiff sought 
actual and punitive damages.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 652–53. 
 70.  Id. at 654. 
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approved through the PMA process included the acetabular shell.71  
The fact that the acetabular shell was previously approved through 
the § 510(k) process did not affect the court’s analysis: 
[T]hat the acetabular shell was previously approved 
through only the § 510(k) process, and was commercially 
available when the Trident System was approved, does not 
change the fact that it was later subject to the more 
rigorous scrutiny of the PMA process as a component of 
the Trident System.  Because the Trident System went 
through the PMA process, and the acetabular shell was 
part of this system, the first part of the Riegel test is 
satisfied.72 
The district court also concluded that because the state law claims 
alleged by plaintiff imposed requirements in addition to those 
imposed by the MDA, they were preempted.73  Accordingly, the 
court dismissed plaintiff’s claims.74 
In Cornwell v. Stryker Corp., plaintiff filed claims against 
defendant alleging defects in the Trident System’s acetabular shell 
caused plaintiff pain and forced him to undergo a revision of his 
total hip replacement.75  As in Lewkut, plaintiff contended that his 
claims were not preempted because the acetabular cup component 
of the Trident System was initially approved via the § 510(k) 
process, not the PMA process.76  The United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho rejected plaintiff’s argument, instead 
concluding “the record in this case supports that the Trident 
System, including its component parts, received PMA approval 
under the PMA process.”77  Accordingly, the court held that 
plaintiff’s product liability claims were preempted.78 
The courts in Lewkut and Cornwell do not stand alone.  In fact, 
several other courts dealing with claims relating to the Trident 
System have similarly held that when the system received premarket 
approval, all of the device’s components, including the acetabular 
shell, received premarket approval.79  This line of analysis is not 
 
 71.  Id. at 656. 
 72.  Id. at 657.   
 73.  Id. at 660. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  No. 1:10-cv-00066-EJL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116824, at *1–2 (D. Idaho 
Nov. 1, 2010). 
 76.  Id. at *3.   
 77.  Id. at *8. 
 78.  Id. at *9.  
 79.  See, e.g., Gross v. Stryker Corp., 858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2012) 
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limited, however, to just those cases involving Stryker’s Trident 
System.  Indeed, courts in cases involving other medical devices 
have similarly found that attempting to separate the component 
parts of a medical device or system that has received premarket 
approval for purposes of preemption is simply not appropriate.80 
VI. THE FDA’S DENIAL OF CITIZEN PETITIONS CONFIRMS THERE IS 
NO SUCH THING AS A LIMITED PREMARKET APPROVAL 
Not to be deterred, plaintiffs in Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc. 
advanced the argument one step further, this time asking the FDA 
to weigh in on the meaning of its PMA letter as it related to the 
question of whether the FDA’s premarket approval of a Paradigm 
Real Time System applied to all aspects and components of the 
system.81 
On June 15, 1999, the FDA granted premarket approval to a 
Medtronic medical device called the MiniMed Continuous Glucose 
Monitoring System, a device that aids diabetics by monitoring 
blood glucose levels.82  “[T]hrough a series of premarket approval 
 
(“Trident System, in its entirety, received premarket approval.”); Bass v. Stryker 
Corp., No. 4:09CV632Y, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90226, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 
2010), aff’ d in part, rev’d in part, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1789 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 
2012) (holding defendant had established that the acetabular shell, as a 
component of the Trident System, “was subject to the rigorous premarket-approval 
review on which the Supreme Court’s analysis in Riegel was based, causing claims 
based on the Shell to be preempted under § 360k(a)”); Lemelle v. Stryker 
Orthopaedics, 698 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. La. 2010) (dismissing state law product 
liability claims against the Trident System, including those involving acetabular 
shells); Funk v. Stryker Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[I]n 
nearly all of the prior district court cases addressing preemption of claims 
involving the Trident, both the plaintiffs and the defendants agreed it was a Class 
III device approved through the PMA process.”); Delaney v. Stryker Orthopaedics, 
No. 08-03120, 2009 WL 564243, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2009) (noting that additional 
discovery was not warranted because defendant had sufficiently demonstrated that 
the entire Trident System underwent the PMA process); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 
No. 08C4248, 2008 WL 5157940, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2008), rev’d, 630 F.3d 546 
(7th Cir. 2010) (noting that Trident, including the acetabular shell, was subjected 
to the process of premarket approval and therefore subject to federal regulations). 
 80.  See, e.g., Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (“Plaintiff’s contention that, in considering a preemption issue, the Court 
must break a medical device into its component parts, is without legal support.”); 
Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 780 (D. Minn. 2009) (“It makes no 
sense—indeed, it would probably be impossible—to pick apart the components of 
a medical device and apply different preemption analyses to different 
components.”). 
 81.  840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 472 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 82.  Id. at 469. 
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supplements, this [glucose] sensor came to include a monitor to 
display the data [obtained] from the sensor; Medtronic named the 
device Guardian RT.”83  Medtronic also marketed Model MMT-
515/715 insulin pumps, Class III medical devices that deliver 
insulin to a patient either automatically or based on patient input.84  
The MMT-515/715 insulin pumps were approved in 2004 via the 
§ 510(k) process.85 
Medtronic subsequently developed the Paradigm Real Time 
System: a combination of the Guardian RT glucose monitor and 
the next generation Model MMT-522/722 insulin pumps that 
allowed the glucose sensor to send data to the pump for viewing on 
the pump’s monitor.86  The Paradigm Real Time System was 
submitted to the FDA on October 4, 2005, as a supplement to the 
prior PMA application for the MiniMed Continuous Glucose 
Monitoring System.87  In its application, Medtronic described the 
Paradigm Real Time System as an “integration of the 515/715 
pump with the Guardian RT.”88  The supplemental PMA 
application was approved by the FDA on April 7, 2006.89 
Plaintiff Judith Duggan utilized a Medtronic Model MMT-522 
insulin pump to treat her diabetes.90  Plaintiffs filed suit against 
defendant Medtronic claiming the insulin pump used by Ms. 
Duggan was defective and caused her to suffer physical injuries.91  
Medtronic subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that, because the MMT-522 pump received premarket approval, 
plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims were preempted by § 360k(a) of the 
MDA.92  Plaintiffs disagreed, instead contending that, while the 
FDA granted premarket approval for certain components of the 
Paradigm Real Time System, the FDA had not granted premarket 
approval for the MMT-522 pump, the part of the system that 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 469–70. 
 87.  Id. at 470. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  Id. at 467.  Specifically, plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of 
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, and loss of consortium.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 468. 
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allegedly injured Ms. Duggan.93  Plaintiffs argued that because the 
MMT-522 pump was substantially identical to the MMT-515 pump, 
which entered the market through the § 510(k) process, state law 
claims specifically and exclusively targeting the insulin pump 
component of the system should not be preempted.94  
“Acknowledging that when premarket approval is granted to a 
system it applies to all devices within the system, [plaintiffs also 
contended] the FDA did not approve the Paradigm [Real Time] 
System as a system.”95  Finally, plaintiffs argued that the language in 
the FDA approval letter for the Paradigm Real Time System shows 
the FDA did not intend to grant premarket approval to the entire 
system.96 
Interestingly, plaintiffs filed a citizen petition with the FDA 
regarding the meaning of the premarket approval letter.97  But the 
FDA denied plaintiffs’ petition.98  In its letter denying plaintiffs’ 
citizen petition, the FDA made clear it intended to grant premarket 
approval to the entire Paradigm Real Time System, including the 
MMT-522 pump: “FDA approved the PMA supplement for the 
Paradigm System, including both the 522 pump and the Guardian 
RT sensor, on April 7, 2006.”99  The FDA further explained: 
The approval reflected FDA’s finding that the PMA 
supplement for the Paradigm System and the original 
PMA for the Guardian RT sensor provided a reasonable 
assurance of safety and effectiveness for the Paradigm 
System.  Because the approval letter, as issued, applies to 
the Paradigm System as a whole, we deny your request to 
amend the approval letter by adding the following 
language: “This approval is limited solely to the ability of 
the pump to accept data from the sensor and the ability 
 
 93.  Id. at 471. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 472. 
 97.  Id.  Plaintiffs also filed a request for testimony with the FDA, which the 
FDA denied, and issued a subpoena to the FDA for a deposition, which the FDA 
moved to quash.  Id. at 472 & n.1.  In its memorandum in support of its motion to 
quash, the FDA argued, in part, that complying with the subpoena would be 
unduly burdensome because the FDA’s citizen petition response obviated 
plaintiffs need for testimony regarding the scope and content of the approval 
letter.  Motion to Quash at 28, Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d 466 (No. 1:09-cv-12046).  
Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their subpoena.  Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 472 
n.1. 
 98.  Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 472. 
 99.  Id. 
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for the sensor to communicate directly to the pump, and 
this approval does not extend to the pump itself.”100 
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the Paradigm Real 
Time System, including the MMT-522 pump, was granted 
premarket approval, and plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted 
under the MDA; therefore, the court granted Medtronic’s motion 
for summary judgment.101 
The FDA’s denial of plaintiffs’ citizen petition in Duggan is not 
the only instance of that occurring with respect to Medtronic’s 
Paradigm Real Time System.  In Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., plaintiff 
Paul Bentzley, who like Ms. Duggan utilized a Medtronic Model 
MMT-522 insulin pump to treat his diabetes, filed a lawsuit after he 
was hospitalized for diabetic ketoacidosis alleging that his insulin 
pump malfunctioned.102  Defendants moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s MMT-522 pump received 
premarket approval and that plaintiff’s claims were therefore 
preempted by § 360k(a) of the MDA.103  Plaintiff responded by 
claiming, in part, that his MMT-522 pump was “separate and apart” 
from the Paradigm Real Time System and thus was not approved 
through the PMA process.104 
As in Duggan, plaintiff sought to bolster his claim by filing a 
citizen petition with the FDA requesting clarification of the scope 
of the FDA’s April 7, 2006 letter granting premarket approval of 
the Paradigm Real Time System.105  Specifically, plaintiff sought to 
amend the letter by adding the exact same language suggested by 
plaintiffs’ counsel in Duggan: “This approval is limited solely to the 
ability of the pump to accept data from the sensor and the ability 
for the sensor to communicate directly to the pump, and this 
 
 100.  Citizen Petition Response Letter from Leslie Kux, Acting Assistant 
Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Charles R. Houssiere, III, Senior Partner, 
Houssiere, Durant & Houssiere, LLP, and Ralph D. McBride, Partner, Bracewell & 
Giuliani LLP (Sept. 23, 2011) (on file with author). 
 101.  Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 473.  In doing so, the court observed: “To the 
extent there was any ambiguity about the scope of the approval letter, this 
rejection of the Citizen Petition is the cherry on the icing.”  Id. at 472. 
 102.  827 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  Specifically, plaintiff asserted 
claims for strict liability, marketing defect, design defect, manufacturing defect, 
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, negligence, and punitive 
damages.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 449. 
 104.  Id. at 450, 451. 
 105.  Id. at 451. 
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approval does not extend to the pump itself.”106 
On September 23, 2011—the same day the FDA denied 
plaintiff’s citizen petition in Duggan—the FDA responded by letter 
and rejected plaintiff’s citizen petition.107  Like the FDA’s letter to 
Ms. Duggan’s counsel, the FDA first noted that “[t]he Paradigm 
[Real Time] System consists of the Paradigm MMT-522/722 
external insulin infusion pump (‘the 522 Pump’) and a continuous 
glucose monitor, the Guardian RT sensor.”108  The FDA further 
observed that “Medtronic modified the 515 Pump and the 
Guardian RT sensor and combined them to create the Paradigm 
System.”109  The FDA’s letter concluded: 
Accordingly, FDA approved the PMA supplement for the 
Paradigm System, including both the 522 pump and the 
Guardian RT sensor, on April 7, 2006. . . .  Because the 
approval letter, as issued, applies to the Paradigm System 
as a whole, we deny [plaintiff’s] request to amend the 
approval letter by adding the [suggested] language . . . .110 
Relying in part on the rejection of plaintiff’s citizen petition, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
held that the entire Paradigm Real Time System, including 
plaintiff’s Model MMT-522 pump, received premarket approval.111 
The following principle can be gleaned from the FDA’s denials 
of the citizen petitions in Duggan and Bentzley: the FDA’s grant of 
premarket approval to a medical device or system applies to all 
aspects and components of that device or system.  This is consistent 
with what courts have previously held, and means that state law 
claims involving medical devices or systems receiving premarket 
approval can only survive going forward if they are truly parallel 




 106.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 109.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 110.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 111.  Id. at 451–52 (“Because the FDA granted premarket approval for the 
MMT-522 System, the Court finds that the Federal Government has established 
requirements applicable to the relevant device.”). 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
The FDA’s denials of the citizen petitions in Duggan and 
Bentzley, along with recent judicial decisions consistently holding 
that premarket approval of medical devices applies to all aspects 
and components of the medical device system at issue, have likely 
sounded the death knell for any future arguments by plaintiffs that 
the FDA granted manufacturers limited premarket approvals that 
do not apply to all aspects and components of a medical device or 
system.  Indeed, the only time such an argument would seem 
appropriate is when the PMA letter itself clearly and expressly limits 
the approval to only certain aspects or components of the medical 
device or system.  As a result, moving forward it seems likely the 
future of medical device litigation, as it relates to the issue of 
preemption, will be focused almost exclusively on the question of 
whether the state claims being asserted by plaintiffs are parallel. 
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